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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Military intervention in the political affairs of a nation has become
phenomenon

in today's world.

It is worth

noting,

sopbers have usually considered it UJlaatural0
entiats have refused to accept this •s
pie have been ff'.w and limited.
the form.of articl�s.
was consid�red �s
Samuel

P.

an

�

a

however, that political philo-

Due to the fact that social sci-

natural occurenca, studies on this to-

The major works done in this area have been in

As early as the 19301s military intervention into politics
ab�rration.

Huntingtom, Morris Janowitz and other authors on military insti�

tutions in developing areas, have identified $everal factors which tend to re�
tard scholaxly research in this field.

These include:

a ) personal values of so

cial scientists; b) the intellectual postures which tend to discourage such

re

search; c) the iuberent S€crecy of military institutions; d ) the political sensi�
tivity of this type of rese�rch with regards to the leaders of these

nations;

c) the pervasiveness of liberal ideology which tends to either ignore the milit�ry
1
or to treat it as an aberration.
However this topic has come into sharper focus lately due to the repeated occurrence of military take-overs in the developing nations.
in September of 1973 in Chile when the military took

The latest coup happ�ned

over

the gove rnme nt of Allende.

As the governmental agencies of these countries are being replaced by military
personnel, a large amount of the n•tion;l budg�t is allocated to military expendi-

-2tureso
in

1966

In Afric2 o:.lone w i th a popula tion
was eight billion dollars.

criticize such

milit�ry

With �

figure

the

militr,
ry

�xpenditure

like: this , one: is tcmpttd to

expenditur�s when the people 0f these nations rema in un-

educated, hungry :..:.nd sick.
Gross National Product,

of 270,000,000

2

Hith regards to the de fense budget a.s

percent of the

a.

Zaire comes first with an e xp enditure ;_mou."1.ting to

5.0��

Somali• comes second with a
and Sudan come fourth with a

3

followed by Congo Brazzaville with a

3.5%

5 o9%o

4. 7%.

lbli

whil� G hana. takes the eight<:.-i:nth �ositior: with

NETHODOWGY

I intend to use Ghana..ia.n milite:.ry ex?eri�ncc �.s a c�sc study and to cornpar(::
empiric a l data of the civilian

r-egime of

(1966-1969).

military rt: gime thGtt overthrew him

make a re&listic
zing agent.

By

j udgement

as to which

modcrr.ization,

Kt·:2...r.ii Nkrum-.h

of

(1960-1966)

In so doing, one should be 2.bl�· to

thesa govarnments is the more moderni-

I mean the ::iegree to wtich

civilian governments brought development

v.-i tb ":.hat of :,he

in

the military and the

Ghana in terms of ci.d�qucite social �-?cl-

fare programs, more s chool s , more he�lth f2 c ilities and better housing.

Hy

data come from

two primary

sources.

the Gh:;;.naian Emb .:3s sy in Wi.shington.

One;

will be economic statistics from

Materia.l from this sour ce includes

reports

of

the various coflll1'1issions of inq·u.iry set up by the military National Liberation Council just �.fter th� coup; the: ir inquiries were designed to find out Nkrumah 1 s expenditures as well as his corruptions.
othe r public2 tion s such RS

th€

Th� second source come s from pe.riodica.ls a:id

vni tcd �etions Statistical Yc3r Book.

Although I will rely he�vily on th� nrimnry sourc�rn, it is worth noting tbC?.t they

ma.y

�e inaccur;.te and insuffic i ent .

Some govC;rnrnents h.ave the tendency of ei th.-:.r

�eporting false figures to protect the integrity of their r�gime or

refusing

to

gi VE:. out certain economic, social or ;::iolitico.:.l d"tf' if they ft" el th�t the re:velation
of sach d<-!ta co'Jli be C?.g<inst tnc i:::-

int:::rcst.

One may the re f ore; find discrep.::nci::s

in. st.'itistic2.l figurss between those provided by the governmr;;nt concern'·:d and t!121s.:-

-3made by other organizati0ns like the

H orld Bank

2nd

internation&l

org•mizat5.ons

collecting statistical d�t2 in that country.
I

chose to do my research on Jh::ma for

n�tion in Africa for both Afric<?.n

many

countries and

uhana has been the 1model1

re;;:sons .

students of 1.frican affairs.

grea.test African Ancient King:l om in the 16th c�ntury flourished

in Gha!l.s.

The

It is

believed that commerc� and naticnalistic political cictivities in Afric� began

this

in

Empire.

In

the 20th century, Ghand..

It weis tht::

firs t

called for independence for :LJ.l
States of A frica

in the

movements

to be the leading

mod ern

nc;.tion

in !-.frica.

bl�.ck Africa.n c ountry that �chieved indepcndenc0 from Brita in,

Nkrumoz.h the leader of the

under Kwami

the Unit�d

continues

Pan

It

African movement.

of African nations

�nder one gove rnm ent .

and

4

P ortugue s e African territories ;md

was

�'fKrumah who

cventu�l form�tion of

an

Kwami Nkrum�h supported guerrilla
South Africa in their figbt for

independence.

According to European
an 1 2dv2nced'

al class

as

country .

hc:.d

well as mt.'.rchants.

of Africa south of

14 years of

It

stand:u-ds, at the time of

�ge are

2

large

rr.idile

class of civil servants and a prof:::ssicn

It also h2d the hi ghe st standard of

the SaharG>. and a high literacy ra.te.
lite ra te .

Approxim•tely 13.3%

of

school and second2ry school compared to 11.5% in the
I

�lso chose to d o

a

independence, Ghan� was

i ts

nation�

rather th�n

�

d ucation

in

About 25% of the p'!oplc

the

all
over

popul�tion is in primary

Con go

and 1.4% in �thi opi a .

a cross-n�tional study because

5

I

think that cross-national research in this field is not only too extensive for time
avail;;ble but.is

empirical

dat:;.,

unneccessary.

CE:rt�in claims

What

see:.!lls

to

about mil ita r y

be most

Ny re; search will :: tte;.pt to

is to test,

using

instit·J.tions by l:Jestern scholars.

These cl�ims argue th<t the military is the most

ing areas.

imp ort an t

mo1ernizing institution in

�v.<luat� this claim

ith

w

d�velop-

reg2r-1 to Ghii..!13.e

-4PROPOSP.LS
My proposals are based upon ce r tain theories or

=. s sumpt

government in dr:ve l op ing are2s m2�e by 1·.7,�ste;rn writ ers .

I shall jividc

!:conl>!!lic

the

propos�ls into two grouns:

1)

i o ns

;;.bout milito.i.ry

For the:. sake

��f�nse 1--.Xpenditur�s

of clarity
ar.d 2)

Deve lopmc:ntal ::-> olicit! s.

Tiefense 1-:Xpenditure
One of the major reasons why mi l itary institutions l!Xist in h.fric 2 is to
protect tbt. n;ction:..l interest and the:: mili ti.ry1 s ov.rn professionalismo

In some

c ·:.:>untrie s whe r e the ffiilitary is ind<!:pt:ndent of the ci vi lian gov e r nrne nt, <S.S was
the

c�se

before the coup of 1967,

of Sierra Leone

nati.·mal budge t were very

small .

forms and ;1ilit<>ry �quipment.

military expenditures in the

The a rmy w._s il l -e quippe d in terms of

uni

Th i s low militu-y profile. w:::s sust ai n ,.: d by the

belief among the poli�ical le�d�rs th�t the �rrrry, giv�n more attention •nd

t he

better st�ndards of living, would become involved in
th� s�nse of

in cre �sing

their demands.

Therefor� th e l��ders tried to keep ths

army apolitical by keeping t:.x::ienditures s mall .
like Ghana during

Nkrumah's regime, •re

political �recess in

The military in some countri�s,
and

ill-equipped

to their co'.mterparts in o the r countries.

infe ri o r in como.srison

Therefore< �.fter a

inili te:ry

tal<c-ov-er

one could expect a substantial increase in expenditures in defense.

Zconomic

De v e lopme nt al ?olicics

The economic aspect
in developing ci.reas.

pectations.

of

modernization ba.s been

m� j or c:rnsc of instability

The major pro blem <U'Ca is the ph�nomencn of r ising E;X

In an e ffort to mobilize the people against the colonial power,

the elites of tl'".ESC nati:ms h· d promisc.d.
Thty had bl<.:.mcd
i<;.1 po'f!c r .

a

th�

a

bcttf..!' stS;nda.rd of livin€;,

under development of the: no.tion

In m �s t countries thc.se elites wer[

'.)r..

able

-:or

�11.

the presence of the colon

to

;;.tt<Ain the ind.epsn'.it?r.ce

-5out thdt economic development was not as e•sy �s getting rid of the colonial
power.

'!'hey realised tha.t they

peoplt.
•re

covld

not fulfill the promises they mrtde to the

T his res'llted in frustration within the masses.

'i'he se frustrations

ch.oi.nneled to ;;i.ctiviti�s which tend to erode th<: hgitimacy of the gov�rn

ment 1 s authority.

Th� instability that usually occurs ca.uses the army to intcr

ven� in the politiccil process.
does not
regime,

ensure

a.

tlow�vl':r taking over tbe

civilian

goverrun�nt

The m:i.lit.s.ry

re::idy-made legitini�cy for the milit:..ry reg�mt.

like its civilian count�r-part, h's to �cquir� its lt.git�re�cy by insuring

economic benefits for the peopl� and relative political stdbility.
Hestern writers of milit-.ry institutions in the devel1)ping a.r�.2s h:t.v�
theorized that the military g ove rnme nts a.re the most �odeI'!'lizing �gent in thtoc
arc�s.

They support such theories by referring to the training abroad of the

officer corps,

the Vestern model of milit2ry organiz-.tion which tbe:ir nations

�.cquired after independence an:i th!.

iemand for ef fi c iency which they s&y is

natur a l in �l military institutions.
If such assumptions

b old

true one could hypothesize the followiRg on

�cono-

mic policies: a) substantial milit�ry inv0lvement in the political process will

be f ollowod by
expenditures,

«

relative

increase

in economic development/infr,-structU!'�

(agricultural, industrial, 2nd tr?de expenditures); b) a sub

stantial military involvement in the politic�l process will not

be followtd by

an i�cre�se in social expe n diturcs o

CHAPTER II

THE E-vOLUTION O?- !1ILITJ.RY

INSTITUTIONS LI.ND ITS H1P_t ST ON THE. ?RDSES3 OF MGDL:PJH6_4'.!:'IO!�

Scbolrrly liter•ture in this area can be divided into thr��

groups; l)li

tc;r;.;.ture ti1.;;t dr,f'ls witb the history of military institutions in Africa;
tur:- tur!'"

tt:;1.t trif.S to

·!'�:;>1:-in

why the milita.ry inkrvenss into th�

2)li-

political

..,6and s ocia l in st ability of the nations •s the c'usc of the military coup.

3) Literature th«.t shows the soldii-�r a s

tings

«

.oi.dminist ra t o r o

political

Such wri

are usually case studi es in which authors try to evalu�te the leadership

of the military governme nt in ;, p�r t ic ul;r. r c ount ry .

In d.11 three ;;;.reC1s, social s cien tists h::vc

bee n more preoccupied with

r e � e a rch de•ling with the exp l�nQ tio n of the soci�l and economic c ondit ion s that

cause the militar y to intervene.

Therefore the m�jor litera turt

on milit�ry

�re� s is of this kind .

institutions in 1eveloping

There �re three major writers on this

to what s�ems to be t he m3jcr po ints .

t op ic .

All of thes� wri t� rs �gr�e

T he se auth ors

James S. Col e man , �nd Belmont Brice Jr.

are

?i� r re v�r. den Bergh�,

There are, of course, others lik�

�l<iude E. Wel ch , Samuel Huntin g t on, Henry Bienen , Morris J;mowitz who h 2ve m;.:.de

contributions to the study of milit•ry insti t ut io ns in developing 2reas.
Van de n oer ghe in bis article,

identifies
tutions .

sev�n type s of

"The 1'1ilitary and Poli t ic e.1 Change in Africa,11

armies in the

e vol ut ion of bf ri can

The f i r st one he calls th� Raiding-Citizens Army.

is.. f o un d during the statel�ss society in Africa before

p�an into the continent.

The army itse lf is

is made up of able-bodied men from

a

milit ary divisions
division is m2de up

Age gr�de d e t ermines the

For tbis r�.?Json, c2cb

b o ys of the sam� age.

The secon1 type of ei.r!lly is the Palace Army.

Th� deve:lapm::.nt of centr<.:lizt:.d

m:inr>rcbies dllring the period of the gr e a t empires of Ghan<?, Melli �nd

tr<>.nsf.:irmed the

R�idi ng

Army to the ?;.lace �rmy.

uf �rganiz�tion in the ��fairs of the st�te
F'al,;;c� .D-r':'JY

·

s the

n<.mle

that it

the sense

It is forme::d sp o n taneously

single t ribe.

to wh ich an individu:�l is a ssigne d .

of men or

Ttis type of army

the co ming of Euro

mono-ethnic in

when tr.ere is • thre:::it of war from another tribe.

militdry insti

was

During this

'

shc.nti,

period S·')mc ki.�1

in it s embryonic stoge.

The

literally inplic: s , c".:>nstit'.lte.s the m�jor instru."!lents of

7

-

powe.:r of the
religion.

-

�stablishment--thc king, the nobility ;;nd the clergy cf the offS..citl

It is :; well organized army and recruitment to it is perm:ment.

officer c9rpe is madt- up of men

of

aristocratic familie:s while the ordin:.?.ry

soldier is of peasant or lower class b�ckground.
ly 'J.n:ler the c cnt r � l of the king.

The::

It is -political -nd is direct

The m�jor Afric�n tribes tha.t had P<ilace

Armies w�re the Ful'ini of northern Nigeria , the -�shanti &nd B�nin p e opl e of
South�rn Ghana,

the Zulu, the Sw&zi -n1 Ndebele tribes of East Afric«.

One

still finds Pal�ce Armies tod�y in areas of Morace�, 1ibya Qnd Ethiopi�.
The thir:i t;irpe of �rmy is the Futch Army.

'rh.:; introduction of modern t.:tcb

nology in the me�ns of war and the recruitm�nt of the peo ple of lower class
st�tus to the officer corps ch�nged the ?<llace Army to the Futch Army.
« v�ry highly professional an:i politicised army.

Jue to its power,

of army is quite independent of politi��l officers.
is typifi�d by !nilit�ry dict�torR'.1ip.

t�.rp<

.x:· �rn;y

t��et

this type

Its intcrn-.1 org•nization

·;�r: C:t n fif!,rgb(. cl�ims tbci.. t.'.:;iE- ic t'.- '

is found in m�y .African countri�s today.

The fourth is the :r�e.·rrc:nv0lk J�rrny.

Thi& typ� of etrmy is typic41..l cf th(

�ilit2=y institution in.South Africa and Rhodesia.
white s:iprC'metcy.

It is

O:'ficcn

·re tll whites.

unarmed �.n1 non-combf.tant troops.

It1s ideology is one of

Non-whites e1!'e recruited as &uxilia.ry

In ajjition to the regul� military units,

other units are designed for the sole purpose of intimid2ting the Pfric;n
population.

The army is �political and is under the stern control of the govern

ment.

The fifth type of army is the Coloniul Army.
w�s found

in th� periods of colonial domination.

was to suppress intern-.J. lfric�n uprisings.
foster ethnic riv,lry a�ong the trib�s.

This is the type 0f •rmy th�t
The purp0se of this army

The colonitl �owers often ai�ed to

�cruitment into the •rmy was th�ref�r�

from illiterate tribes that hc;.vc a strong milit,.ry tr•diti·:m �nd ar� noi:.e:� for
their ficrcenlss.

P.s :;_ mt.&nl! to muimiz� tht: r1.:;li�bility of colonie:.l 8oldicrs,

-8-

6
The

troops were often stati0ned �way fr0m home among tradi t i on al. enemies.

c0lonitl army w�s th�refore regarded by the Afric�n with hate 2nd fe�r.

Due to the high illi ter•.cy r-.te in the ;irmy, the mili t•ry profession is
still linked with lower status pers onnel .
of past colonial sh.me.

In tbe eyes of ma.ny it is

;{

symbol

Van d en Berghe note d that in orde r for such milit�ry

institutions to be more effective the y would h�ve to ch�nge this im•geo
ot.ber words they w�uld h«ve to cre2te
�nd the rest of the popul �tion.
done.

In

a good relationship b�twe!:en themselves

He sugge5ted two ways by which this can be

The first tbing is tc tr-.nsform the •.rmy L'1to what lrn called a li t�r;;.te

citizcns1army which is to be prop•gandized fully into the n ational

ideology.

lfaking the soldier li ter-.te would remove the reput -.t io n of 11uncivil i ze d

and

savage" which the so ld i e r �cquired during the coloniel period, a.nd m&l.king them
n'tiontlistic would cr.,se the old im a ge of the army as a tool
oppreesion.11 Th� second soluti·:m he

11f or foreign

suggested is to use the arrrzy- in such con-

structive purposes as scinitiltion, re scue crews, tr'"ns:;; ortation and in "Public
work.

Building bridge s and roa.ds, and ;i dmi nist e ring medical aid would be most

effective in ch:11nging th�

image of the African J.i_rmy.

However ht"; noted that the

tr-.nsformation of the Colonial Ar;ny into ;, lfation<?.l P.rmy would not tdke; pl�C(!..
overnight.

Ind��cd,

as 'Jan den Berghe him s e lf ccncluded,110ne should not expect

7

The Nation•l Arrrry is the seventh type of �r my .
is the ideal type.

To �rc.n den Bergh�, this

This type of army would be modern but •politicR.l and under

the control of the civilian governmei:t.

V-.:n den B ergh� claimed n'Jne of t..h� /�fri-

can military institutions ha�re r e ach e d this sta ge.

Most of the- mili-C.s.ry in-

stitutions today in hfric� not only l�ck � set �f p �l itic2l id�ologies, but �rf.
rel�tiv�ly in:fop�ndent of the powc:r of th<:. pol itic:ol lc-:::der.
litic2l lc-Jer needs thf

In .:'c;._ct, the:; po-

strong b2cking of thc milit ? ry in or��r to stay in

powc:: r and r-c.le r.f:Cecti vcly.

The hetc-rogcnous com-o os iti0n of th� ;i.rmy m<. k.:.s th-::

-9illstitution ef t hs Nation.al Army impossible.

N�tion;i.l in this sense me;i.ns that

e�ch soldi(;r views himself ::<s a "'._)art of tht'! whole nati·)n, rather than in terms
In th� Gb:A.nai;;i.n army, the of ficer corps is occupie d by the well

of tribalism.

educ:rted south�rn.ers, while the Grdin;r.ry soldie-rs mos tly come from the l�ss
educ;ted end Muslim Nerth.
tribalism in the army.

8

On� could therefor� exp�ct &n int e nse

problem of

In 'their art icle 11The Role of the Military in Su b-Sah �.r �n t:..frica,11

Jif.mf.S

S. C <i>lem •n and Bel.rnont Brice Jr. try to point out the legacies of the colonial
rule an the rnilitary est2blishm·"nt of Afric«..
B�l gian and Portuguese Africa n territories.

He l ooks �.t the .British, French,
For my p�per, th�

be OR the British and :french West Afric01n territories..

e mpb�s is

will

In West Africe1, Coleman

:md Brice stated that the British. did not conceutratc on building a str·.mg and
�ff�ctiv� military establishmcRt.

They also note d the imbalance of tribal group

represent.. tion in the army th�t 'hn den Berghe mentioned .

The: British bad a

poli cy of recruiting the officer corps fr0m the dominent group or tribe.

This

is one of the causes ef the pr ese nt d�y tribalism of the •rmy in Afric' t od2y .
The French,
army.

on

the other hand, view their colonial armies as p •.rt of the French

Ther efGr e the French did not develop any territGria.l -.rmy in the colonies.

Coleman aRd BricG n 0te d th�t these co lo nie s, even �ft e r independenco, were very

depend-ent

on

their former colo ni �l ?ewers for military aid. Hewever they con-

eluded th•t there is a growing tendency �.mong th e se n<.;.tions to diversify tneir

9

dependency to other nd.tions.
The scccmd p2rt of my literature review d�als with the li te r a tur e r)n th�
ca.us�s ef mil ite..ry intervention int o the politiccil pr oce s s .
will inclt:.:io literature

In this s e ction, I

th�t dc;ils with the mili t2.ry as a madernizing agent.

-�'lfriters :Ln this 2re:et i.nclu':!e Glaude :. He-lcb, M�rtin �. N�cdler, Samuel ?.
Huntington, Lucien ?ye,

Gujr P2rc
i er, Hartin J. Le;vy, John P. Lovel and I. Eugene

-10Kim, Mo r ris J a nowitz, Lerner and Turner.
Apa.rt from Janowitz, Lerner,

and Turner, most of these writars claim th3t

the military is the only hope for substantial development in the third worlc.
They use the or gani zatio nal model of the milite.ry institution as basis for their
argument in making such claims.

They argue that by virtue of the professi� nalis m

of all military institutions and the

t rai�ing

of their officers it should stand

a

to reason th t the military is the most m o::ie rnizing agent in these nations .
In

1960

Lucian Pye claimed that one of the great forces o f today is the dynamic

i

and self sacrificing mil tary leaders of the dev elopin g areas w ho a.re committed
to progress and the task of mo::iernizing their societies th2t have been sub-

10
verted by the corrupt practices of politicians.
Guy Parker, who has written on the military in South East Asia and spe-

cifically dealing
th9t area,

with

the problem of combating the spread of Communism into

stated that the politicians in that area would not be able to cope

with the instability caused by Communist infiltration because they have neithGr

e

the prestige of the traditional aristocrats nor the pr s tige o f th e first
generation of leaders.

lie said th�t those best equipoed to become an effective

counter�balance to the spread of Communism and instability are the members of

the national officer corps �s individuals and as nati0nal armies in their organizational structures.

He noted that the s oldiers personal qualities of

lea.de rship, patriotism and cmnmitment to moral values a.re products of modern.

ization and shoulj be the only non-Gormnunist group equipped to modernize tbese

11

countries.
Martin J. Levy stated that the ar:ned forces organization is the
cient type of organization for the

combining

of maximum rates o f

tion with a maximum le:vel of st ability and con7.ro;..

12

most

effi-

moderniza-

The major ?oint of John P. Lowel ani I. !.:.ug ene ;cim is that the mili tarJr
:;;;lays an imcortant p-=.rt in the socializatj_on an:i co:rn.mi..mic2tion funct ·:.ons of th�

-11new states,

because its own requirement demands that it be rational, univer-

salistic and industrial oriented.

Its recruitment of civilian personnel into

the arrr.y and its contact with the rest of the population, help in the socialization of the civilian into mod€rn western society.

Because of these reasons

these a.uthors believe that the militaI"J is a vehicle for national integration
and economic and political stability.
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The major theoretical work on military intervention into the political
process is d':>ne by Lucian Fye, Clcmie �. Welch 2nd Robert D. ?utmano
though they seem to be saying the same thing,

I

::.ven

think it i� worth. :revtewing.. �ome

of their major works.
Lucian Pye in his work "The Armies in the Process of Political Mc�erniz.ation", claimed that most of the military establishment in developing areas acquired their institutional model from the West.

In so doing he said these armies

have underta�en to create a form of organization typical and peculiar to thz most
highly industrialized civilization yet knowno
industrial skill

In order to achieve the high

.charact.e.ristic::.:Of We�tern ·mi.::titary irts·tit:U:tio�'! j')e said that

most of the military officers had to be sent abroad for military training.

In

an attempt to compare the soldier with his civilian co unter-part in the process
of modernization, Pye stated that the soldier is more determined to modernize
the society than the politicians.

He gave two reasons for this:

1)

due to the

fact that all military establishments are by nature rival institutions, the soldier is often called upon to compare his standards with other armies of the
world.

On the other hand the politician

compare himself.

does not have a s imilar institution to

Because the military uses an international yardstick to measure

tbe degree of its own development, it is therefore more sensitive to the backt(

�.

wardness of his country and is more commited to nevelop it.

2)

�ue to their

�rofessionalism and training abr�a.d, the milit2i:-y is divorced from the realities
of their traditional society and is more socialized with the industrial 1'7estern

-12...
culture .

Pye noted that in the developing areas the soldier sh ould not only be

a good soldier but a good soldier must also be a moderni zed man.
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Robert Do Putman • s work is on the military intervention in Latin Amarican
countries.

Zven though the conditi0ns for military interventian in Latin American

countries may be somewhat different from those in Africa, I think � i s conclusion i s worth menti oning in this paper .

Before looking at Futman ' s work, it is

important to bear in mind that there are great differences between military institutions in Africa and in Latin America.

In talking about these differences,

Jose Nun, one of the prominent auth ors of military institutions in Latin America,
stated that the major difference lies in the fact that there is a greater degree
of expansion of industrialization in Latin America than in Africa.

He also noted

that the military profession is more respected in Latin America because the armed
forces are well integrated into the society.

This makes the military more insti-

tutionalized in Latin American than their counter-part in Africa.

Finally, he

claimed that military intervention does not threaten the middle class nor is it
a substitute for its absence but that the military tenjs to represent that clas s .

.
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Because of this Nun believes that the military in Latin America inhibits change.
In Africa the military officers do not represent any traditional l�ndowning
aristocratic or an urban bourgeoisie.
existent.

These classes are very weak and even non-

Africanization of the officer corps began after independence in many

countrie s .
Mr. Putman investigated five areas in h i s rssearch:
velopment of the country;
establishment;

4)

2)

Its soci o-economic development;

Foreign influence on the military;

influence on the so ciety.

1)

5)

The political de-

3)

Its military

The military trend and

He arrived at the following conclusion with regards

to the probability of military intervention in Latin American politics;

a)

that there is very little evidence linking politicai de velopment to ffiilita�y abstention in

politic8; b )

that widespread participation in elections, strong

-13...
parties and �res sure groups and freedom from politi cal violence are neither necessary
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nor sufficient for military abstention from politics .

CH.APTER III
CAUSZS OF !1ILITJ:.RY IHT3RW.YTION IN POLITIC.S
The major explanation of military intervention into the political
in Africa is made by Claude E . Welch .

-process

Welch begins his article by identifying

three types of military inv·olvement into the political proc e s s .
In the immediate post-independence period t h e army was for t h e most part
an advocate of non-involvement.

The reason for this is that during this period

the anny was still under the control of expatriate officers wh0 were �ommitted
to maintain the government in power .
The second type of military involvement came in the form of mutinies.

The

aim of these mutinies was not to overthrow the civilian government but rather
to force the government t o increase salary scale of soldiers, to institute nension benefits and to A.fricanize the officer corp s .

It i s worth noting the African-

ization of the officer corps of the army was very slow in the post-independence
period.

For example in

1959

in Ghana, the officer corps was only made up of ten

percent of the native Ghanaians.
patriate s .

The majority of the officer corps were ex-

I t must be noted here that Ghana at that time occupied the highest

level of education in Sub-Saharan Africa.
there were no African officers in

1960.

In the Belgian Force Republique

The reason for t h i s late Africani-

zation of the officer corps has been cited as the unavailability of Africans
with the required education.

Howeve r , three yesrs later in

1960

in Obana, the

Africanization of the officer corps increased from ten percent to forty percent.
This increase was no doubt a re sult of the intense demand of the African soldiers
to enter the officer corp s .
The third type of involvement i s the coup d ' etat.

This type of involvement

-14i s directly aimed at replacing politicians and civil servants in the administra
tion of government .
ber of

1958

The first coup d 1 etat in Africa was in the Sudan in Novem

when General Ibrahim Abboud and some officers took over that

goverrunent .

There has been a succession of coup d 1 etats since that time to the

present.
Welch pointed out seven factors that cause the military to intervene into
the goverrunent.
partie s ;

2)

These are:

1)

decline in the prestige of the maj or political

schism among prominent politicians which weake n the solidarity of

the broadly based Nationalist movement

or

party of the colonial period;

likelihood of external intervention in· the event of a military coup;
tagion11

S)

from seizures of control

4)

3)

the

" con

by the military in other African countrie s ;

domestic social antagoni sms, most obviously manifested i n countries where a

minority group exercised c ontrol e .g . the Arabs in Tanzania, the Mende in Sierra
Leone and the Watuse in Burund i ;

6)

the e conomic instability in the country,

which in turn leads to the implementation of austerity economic policies ef
fecting the articulate ,
members, the

urbani zed sector of the population such as trade union

army and civil servant s ;

7)

corruption and inefficiency of govern

ment and party officials especially during a period of e c onomic decline ;

8)

a

heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace
political leaders.
Decline in P

arty Prestige

Welch deals with some of these points in detail, one of which is decline
party prestige .

in

�elch claimed tbat there i s usually a s ingle party in the post

independent Africai countries that is most powerful and respected by all.

An

exa.mple of such a party is the Convention Peoples Party of Ghana and the Sierra
Leone P€0ples Party.

These parties acquired such power and prestige because

�hey had mobilized the population against

their

colonial powers and bad suc

cess f·J.lly won the independence of their countries .

The leader of

such

a party

-15-

like Kwami Nkrumah of Ghana or Sir Milton Margai of .Sierra Leone are respected
even to the point of being worshipped.

Nkrumah was called by such names as

Osajifo, the father of the nation, the redeemed and even the messiah by bis
people.

The nation was united as one under this leader.

unity a heterogenous monolith .

Welch called this

The leader maintained such a unity by blaming

the poverty and backwardness of the country on the exploitation of the colonial
power, and by promising them a better standard of living after independence
had been achieved.
and uneducated.

However, after independence the people remained poor, h llngry

The political leaders have not lived up to their promises of

a better standard of living for all.
heterogenou.s mono-ethic.
sentiment.

S oon there began to appear cracks on this

Primodial attachment became stronger than national

Participation in politics intensified.

However such participa-

tion took the form of an obsessive concern with the relation of one ' s tribe,
religion or sect to the center of power.
timacy to govern became intense.

Opposition to the leader and his legi-

At this point the leader or party resorted

to ways and means to get rid of the opposition and limited freedom of speech·:
and movement .

The opposition in the government is removed in the following

1) by creating civil actions against politicians through legal restrictions

ways:

on their activities; 2 ) by manipulating the electoral machin�ry against opposition candidates; 3) by increasing the rewards for ncarpet crossing11 ; 4) by removing the spokesman of the major opposition groups through political house
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arrest.
The leader or party continues to rely increasingly on the use of force
to achieve its goal.

As it has always been the case, increasing the use of force

by the government increases the significance and

power

of the army.

On

the

other hand the power and prestige of the leader or the party continues to decline .

In Ghana for example , the

use

of force by Nkrumah and the Convention

-16Pe ople ' s Party against opposition res:llted in the loss of h i s power and prestige
he had at the time of independence.
Political Schism
Tbis is uaually a political split among top party officials.

Welch pro-

posed that in a state where political rivalry cannot be contained within the
framework of a single party, the likelihood of a military intervention is increased.

He gave some examples of such occurenc e s .

I n Sudan General Ibrahim Abboud

was invited to take over the goverrunent due t o a constitutional deadlock in
the government .

In the Congo, the military and General Mobutu took over the

government when the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu found themselves in a constitutional impasse .

Patrice LUJ'!lumba had ruled

unconstitutional his dismissal from the position of Prime Minister by the President.

In both of these cases the army sees itself a s the only hope t o restore

the country to normalcy.

General Soglo, the head of the Dahomean coup d 1 3tat,

sul1111larized the military rationale for a coup :
"The trouble witb our country,

as you know, is separat

ism and regionalism with all their threats of divi

s i on.

The political leaders are not bad, they are men

with great qualities who have rendered considerable ser
vice to their country, but they have proved that they
ca.."1.not rise above their personal quarrels

•

•

•

Our ob

j ective is to introctuce into this country a new style
of politics in ·wh ich the p e ople will rally around a
program and not around personalities.11
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Possibility of ::Xternal I ntervention
Welch _'.,)reposed that a threat of an external intervention t o stop a co·1p
d ' etat woulci signifi cantly effect the possibilities of the army intervention
into the political proces s .

Thera are four conditions that may ca·u&c a pc:rti-

cular foreign country to intervene to s.top a coup.

1)

If that nation has a good

investm:;; nt in that country, the fear that such an inv:; stment might be confisc2ste::l by the rr:.ilitary goverru7lent c::>uld cause that country to intervene and
to stop the coup d ' etat.

2)

I f th�t r.ation �as a goo1 number of its ?E OPlE

try

-17residing in that country, it may intervene if it feels that the new military
government may cause some oolitical troubles for that population.

3)

The cold

war rivalry may also cause a particular foreign country to intervene and stop ·a
coup d ' etat if it feels

that the new military government may pursue policies

that would be detrimental or at le2st unfavourable in terms of the cold war
strategies.

4)

The presence of a good number of expatriate military officers

in the national army may prevent African officers and soldiers from embarking
on a coup d ' etat .

The reason for this is that the expatriate officers are commit-

ed to maintain the African government concerned.

The African political leaders

do realize the importance of expatriates in the officer corps .

After indepen-

dence some have tried to maintain a good number of expatriates in their armies .
During Nkrumah ' s regime , the highest military officer in Ghana was an expatriate.
The political leaders have also tried to maintain foreign military personnel
in the armies by signing military agreements with their former colonial powers.
Most of the French colonies signed bilateral treaties with France shortly after
Independence.

The agreements of the treaties permit an extensive 11interconnection

between France and the colonial armies, to a point of allowing France both to
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intervene directly and to establish bases and military installations . "

The

agreement s also provide that the African leaders appeal for French assistance in
maintaining the organization of their own armies .

This means that the African

leader may call for French military assist8nce to crush down an attempted coup
d ' etat.

In adiition to French declarations to aid the government at a time of

an attempted coup or political unrest, the treaties provide for a regional military organization to co-ordinats military assista�ce and activities among member
countries.
de Defense

This regional organization is named the Uni�n Africaine et Malgache

(U.A.M.�. )

The members of this org�nization which include all former

Frenca colonies except Juinea, Mali and upper Volt a, agreed to come to the defense
of any member state threatened by a cou? or political unre st.

Britain has an

-18agreement with s ome of its colonial territorie s .

However the agreements are

exclusively bilateral and do not have a regional military organ i z ation like
the Union Africaine et Malgache de Defense of the �rench colonieso

However in

both agreements, there are provisions for mutual defense, for military equipment and the training of the officer corps.

France has a troop of

soldi€rs stationed in hfrica, Britain has at the present
States has between

5,500

and

6,ooo

2,000

16,000

and the United
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troops stationed in Ethiopia. and L iby e. •

These treaties that the African leaders make with their former colonial
powers and other foreign countries are des igned mainly to safeguard them from
military coup.

I t i s worth noting here also that. the signing of these treaties

give the former colonial power or foreign countri; greater influence in the country and on the leader as a whole because the extent to which the leader remains in
power is dependant upon his relationship with the foreign power.

If the re-

lationsbip is unfavourable the foreign power may either abondon its commitment
to protect the leader or it may supµort or even instigate a couD with the collaborat ion of the members of the army.
Contagion Effects
This is more like a chain reaction of coups.

A succes sful coup d ' etat

in one state may cause a chain reaction of c oups into other state s .

For exa�ple

it i s believed the coups that occured i n Central African Republic, Dahomey,
T ogo and Upper Volta are manifestations of this Contagion Sffect.
reaction of coups is made poss ible by two factors :
A£rican military officers in different countries ;

1)

2)

The chain

the pers onal links among

an

increasing extent of

inter-African state ties.
Host of the military officers in today ' s African army attended the sa.�e
school.

For €Xfu�ple, the scbool where most of the officers from the British

colonies have been educated in Sandhurst in E�glanQ..
Sierra Leone, Nigeria,

'l'his is wh ere soldiers from

Ghana , Y.e:nya and Uganda meet an:i become acqucinted id. th

-19It is believed that

the same technique of mili tary organization and ideology.

a successful- coup instigated by one may prompt others to do like�ise in their
own countryo
The increasing inter-t.frica.n re lations at the United Nations, at the Organization of African Unity and in other e conomic and political alliances may
cause a country to intervene or instigate a c oup d ' etat in a neighboring country.
Unstable S ocial Conditions as a Course for Military Intervention
Such intervention usually occurs �hen a tribe or tribe s ' faction in the
army see the government as dominated by a single tribe and pursuing policies that
are hostile to its interest .

An exa111ple of this type of intervention is the

1966.

Nigerian coup d ' etat of January

The Ibo tribal group in the army per-

ceived the federal government to be pursuing policies that were antagonistic
to the Ibo population.

This was why the Ibos instigated the coup .

The same

thing happened in Zanzibar where a revolutionary military force overthrew a
minority government dominated by f.rabs and Shirazis.
Stagnating Economic Conditi ons
1·:elch points out that the ex-cravagant expenditures and inefficient management in the goverrunent may result into poor economic conditions wb ich may invite
the military to intervene .
Before proce€ding to the main body,it is important

at this point to make

some general introductory notes on Ghana, its geographical location and economy.
Ghana is situated on the west coast of Africa,
square miles.
of

3.4

million.

it covers an area of

Tbis area is just about tbe size of Oregon.

i s Accra with an 2rea of
pe0ple .

0thEr

Kum&si with

It has a population

Seventy ?Srcent of these people live in the southern

the country which is much more developed th an other areas.

maj:)r

') ' 1 1.
0
_,
.J/

618

squrr�

mil�s

mil�:l:.
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part

of

The capital of �hana

and a population of

tmms include Sekondi-'I'akordi with 367

91, 943

337.6

tqu�r�

thousand

:nilc :i

and

-20:::: ocoa production acc ounts for

Ghana ' s economy is based on agriculture.
about

7CJJ.,

of Ghana ' s export earnings.

However the decline in cocoa price in

the world market has resulted in a continuous balance of pavment deficit.
-

Other agri cultural products include rice,
yam and plantain.

corn, millet,

"

groundnuts ,

cassava,

Mining is carried on extensively with the major minerals of

diamond and gola and brixite.
The per capita income in Chana averages
highest in Sub-Saharan Africa.

8214

per year.

Ghana has the highest literacy rate in Africa.

There are three major tribes and over

SO

different dialects spoken in Ghana.
Ghana ' s armed forces number

The major tribes are the Ashant i , �'we, and Fanti.

17 , 000

and the National Police Ser-vice h a s

18, 000

Ghana achieved its independence on March

22
men.

6, 19$7

from Britain under the
first Prime Minister and

leadership of Kwami Nkrumah , who became the countey • �
later President .

This is one of the

He reigned from

1957

to

1966

when the military overthrew

the government .

CHAPTER IV
'.\IHY DID THE MILITARY INTERVENE IN GHANA ?
In bis article "Military Officers and Leadership," Robert Price identifies
two types of motivations for military coup in develo�ing areus .
societal interest and m
: ilitary profe ssional interest.

These are

·with regards to societal

interest, Price says that this involve s the military intervention into the political process to prevent some change in the total society or one of its subsystems.

Corruption and mismanagement in the civilian government is usually

motivation for the military to stage a coup d ' etat.

The rationale for tt€ c o up

is usually given as to stabilize the e conomy tbrot:.gb the institution of new
social and economic programs such a s land reforms .

A cOUJ? d ' etat of urof&ssicnal

inter€st is usu.:;.lly staged to protect milit;ry a.u.tonomy an:l _prerogative .
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-21The Ghana coup was staged not only on the grounds of societal and professi onal
interest but t o safeguard individual freedom and liberty.

1)

reasons why the military intervene s :

There are three

military professional interest--to

prevent Kwami Nkrumah ' s control and manipulation of the military institution;

2)

to protect individual freedom and liberty;

intervened to bring back economic stability.

3)

societal interest.

The military

It is worth pursuing these reasons

in detail.
The Military and Nkrumah
Africanization of the Ghanaian army took place �rery slowly during the
colonial period .

At the tune of Ghana ' s independence the Ghanaian army officer

corps was made up of only

10%

Ghanaians,

the maj ority was occu.pted

by

expatriate s .

This t-ras a very small number for a countr;>r that had the highest standard of
education in Sub-Saharan .Africa.

�vnen l'Ikrumab became Prime Minister, b i s first

goal was to update the Ghanaian arny .
Nkrumah ' s political goals.

The reason for this was encapsulated i n

Because Nkrumah was the first black African to have

successfully won the independence of the first black African country, he saw
himself and Ghana as the leader and the centre for African political and
economic spheres.

He saw the West as the most exploitive nations in Africa and

he called for unity of Africa against Western imperialism.

He proposed the

future formation of a United States of Africa after colonialsim ha.d teen driven
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out of the continent .
Due to these goals, Nkrumah saw the armed forces of Ghana as a symbol of
national integration,

a. necess ary bulwark against a serious threat to inte!'nal

se curity and a tangible earnest of his right to military leadership in Africa.
He increased the army from
it doubled to

14,000.

In

4, 000

1960

in

1959

to

7,000

1, 200

1960-61.

By

1966

be established the Ghana Military Academy.

�he number of African officers increased to over
as many as

between

200

in

1961;

by

1966 there were

African o:ficers i n the three branches of the armed forces .

-22To make the military profession attractive he increased the army 1 s salary and
fringe benefits.

Statistics show that in 1961 a newly commissioned 2nd lieu-

tenant re ceived a salary of $663 per year, a college graduate received $680.
At the same time the salary of private soldiers was increased to twice that of
2s
the national minimum wage .
There was also an increase in the African officer corps in the navy and
air force .
African

Between the time of independence i n March 1957 t o Auril 1961 the

corps

increased from 2$ to 150 respectively.

There was a considerable increase in the government military expenditure .
Between 1954-55 military expenditure increased from 1.5 percent of the total
national budget to 5 percent in 1957 and 1960.

Between 1962 and 1963 tbe ex

-

penditure rose to 7 .5% and in 1965 it increased to 8.4% of the national budget.
The police force was increased from 6 , ooo to 7 ,500 from 1957 to 1961.
By early 1966 it was 12,500.
26
officers was forty-seven.

The number of foreign trained African police

Nkrumah ' s Control of the Army
The tension between the army and Nkrumah began from 1961 through 1963.
There was

During this period, Ghana ' s economy was on the verge of disaster.

the problem of rising costs of living because the Ghanaian cocoa production was
drastically reducei due t o the attack of swelling stoot disease on tbe crops .
Nkrumah exhausted Ghana ' s foreign rese rve to finance his
projects.

There

policies.

There were strikes all over the country.

1rns

a lot of

discontentment with

extravagant

the regime and its economic

In an effort to curb opposition Nkrumah resorted to control
of governmental as

well

as private activities

throughout

J.!lana. .

of

all spheres

He

instituted

the Preventive

Detent ion Act �o reduce political opposition.

T�is

for th& arrest

and d et e nt i on

to

of

uers".lns

Known to be

development

dangerous

act

the

�rovided

s t. at e .

The

' state ' was Kwami Nkrumah .

He later

amme nd ed

this act to detain political

prisoners for a period of ten years without trial.

·-:ith the help of �is Con-

vention Peoples Party, Nkrumah took deliberate meas ures to control the armed

forces, especially the military.

These steps included:

1)

the formation of

a separate military regiment to counterwe ight the regular military.

(P.O.G.R. ) .

ment was called the Presidents Ovm Guard .Regiment
regiment bad

1,142
27

security units.

men and

50

officers.

In

This regi-

1966

this

It was made up of about a dozen smaller

This becar:ie the legitimate armed for ce of Ghana as far as

Nkrumah was concerned.

He neglected the rest of the armed force s .

The national

military budget was devoted mainly for the upkeep of this President ' s Cwn Guard
Regiment .

It was equipped with the besi::. military we apons and was giYen preference

in terms of military material an::i benefits. Major Ocran, one of the participants in the coup, described the condition of the army during this period
vividly:
"Since the approved type of officers uniform material could
not be obtained,

officers started acquiring and wearing all

sorts of Khaki drtll frum J apau, Am'"'r icd., Sanadtt, crr1a even

�he U��H• • • 1� wtts no surprise, therefore, that the morale
should suffer, and the pride of the regular was hurt • • by

1965

the situation had become critical

•

•

tbe effective admini

stration of units became impossible and the operational

efficiency of the armed forces dropped considerably . "
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The formation of the Fresiient ' s Own Guard Regiment was opposed very
strongly by many of the officers.

Nkrumah fired Major Ankra fr om his corru.Tiand

of the Ghanaian milit�ry force for openly oppos ing the institution of the Fresident ' s Regiment .

In an effort to inflitrate the regular army, Nkrumah es-

tablished an intelligence age ncy called the Arme d Force Bureau. I n

1964

he

ordered that the military enlist all personnel in the Conven�ion Peoples Party.
lie also 1emanded a perio�ic affirmation of the army ' s fidelity to hi�.
In

f'orce.

1964

an atte�npt was made to 2saasinate Nkrum2.h by :: member of the police

:s'or this reason Nk::umah d i sar!'!1ed �he entire police force, deta ined

-24...
eight of its most senior officers and transferred the police special branch to
the President ' s Own Guard Regiment.
Between. 1960 and 1963 the fear of a military coup instigated by a Western
government, especially the United States, caused i�krumah to increasingly rely
on the Soviet Union and ::ast Zuropean countri�s for military aid.

In

July-

August of 1961 he made an extensive tour of the USSR, Poland, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Red China.
agreements with each of these countries.

He

entered into rnilitar"J

As soon as h e returnej to Jhana, �e

ordered that 400 cadets from tha Ghanaian army be sent to the Soviet Union for
of�icer training.
corps .

This move was objected to by the majority of the o.2'ficer

One of the officers who objected to this was a British officer in the

Ghanaian army, General Alexander who was the chief of defence .

In a letter to

the deposed General Akra, '.}eneral l!lexander wrote:
11The P:-esident proposes to send 400 potential officers to
the Soviet Union for training. I have done all I can to
persuade him that such action is neither necessary nor
prudent It is unwise for several reasons. Firstly,
it splits the training and outlook of the officer corps
into two camps, and can breed neither contentment nor
efficiency. Secondly, I considered that such action may
in the long-term prove dangerous to the President
bimself •1129
•

•

Before this time all the �ilitary training of the Ghanai$n officer corps
had been in Sanhurst, Zngland .

3eginning

in 1962 Nkrumah began to recr'.lit

rtussians as agents t o supervise the armed for ces.
This withering away of the army• s autonomy, �1rofe s s i onalis:n and prerogative le� the officer corps and the �olice force to take Jver the government
while Nkrumah was flying from Rangcon to Peking in Februar-� of 1966, on a
mission to bring peace in iJi.et Nam.
',fnen the

:nl.J.. .i. -r,ary

t.ook over power one u.f "(.be first things it h?.d to

do was to u:;1dc.te itself.

r:'here ::·:r:=s a gr.:at nt:: cd for eqi.'.ipment an::l uniforms.,

3ecd.USB 0f tri.s need, the:-e 1:1as a sutsto.ntici.l increase i!l tne :iera ::isc

cu..1g..;-c

-2�there was an average annual increase

during tbe era or the military regirr,e.
of 22%

1966

ver !-JKrumah ' s

v

budget in

l9b8

1966

a.nd

defense bu\.lget.

1969.

There

30

was

This was 1.nc.!'easea to

41.4%

ove r

the

a l s o an increase in foreign reld:ti')n

TiBLS I

19b8-9

1966-67

l9b7-�

Nkrumah

Mil.1tary Govt .

Defense

+4.0

"*'-lest Africa,

July 27,

Average

22.0

+20,0

1968.

p.

868.

When asked to explain the increase in the military expenditure Brigadier
Afrifra replied that the increase was due to "the neglect suf:'ered by our J..rmed
Forces in the past,

it has become impe rative t o re-equip the e ntire

31

army to

justify its existence . "
My proposal on defence expenditure in this case seems t o h old true , I
stated that military involvement in political �rocesses will be

followed by

an increase in defence and foreign expenditure s .
Economic Conditions
�he second reason for the coup of

1966

in Ghana at the time of Nkrumah ' s regime .
it a model for Africa in terms

of

comes from the economic cor.ditio.is

Nkrumah ' s e:;oal for Ghana w�s to make

mode::.·ni zati ::")ll

eentre of the Pan African movement.

and

tech nology,

well a s the

His economic ")Olicies were therefore geared

towc.rd the attain."llent of these goal s .
mic ?Olicies to the e c onomic policies

I n an

of

Ef.:'ort

t o compare Nkruman' s

econo-

the military government, I will try- to

pursue the economic condition under the heading of agriculture,
injustry and foreign debt

as

�oreign �ra�e,

•

.h.griculture
:'his occu:'.)ies the m:oinstay of the e c on::>n;v- in ::lhanfl .

S""Gatistics shoF that

...26seventy percent of the population is actively engaged in this sector.
thought to contribute one-half of the gross national p�oduct.
crop grown.

It is

Cocoa is the major

In fact Jhana has been characterized as a one-crop economy country.

�ith concession to fluctuation of cocoa prices in the international market,
cocoa alone accounts for

65%

of the expeirt earnings and it's a major SO'tlI'Ce

of government revenue and development expend iture .
millet,

Other c rops include maize,

rice, groundnuts , cass�va, yams and plantain.

Nkrumah ' s economic policies were based on his political philosophy.
economy wa::; strongly controlled by the stat e .

�he

This policy was derived from two

sources ; first of all Nkrumah saw the Western democratic nations as the most
exploitive nations in Africa.

On the other hand, he saw the Soviet Union as an

ally for the destruc�ion of Western imperialism in Africa.

He was attracted to

Marx-Lenin theories of capitalism, especially Lenin ' s theory of imoerialism.
Because of this attitude toward the West, Nkrumah increas ingly relied upon the
Soviet Union for economic advi 0� .
agsncies in Ghana.
condly,

Russians supervised many governmental

The result of this was a highly centralized economy.

Se-

opposition and discontment with Nkrumah ' s repress ive measures was so

he ightened that Nkrumah had to fill governmental positions with his party loyalThus, like the Soviet Union, Nkrumah ' s Convention P e oples Party bec�'lle

ties.

the state .
cials .

The members of the Convention Pe oples ?arty became the state offi-

'I'he members of the Convention Peoples Party became the New Class in

Djilas terminology.

Describing this new class, Colonel Afrifra of the Ghana

National Liberation Council said:

11 This new class began to assert itself in

our society, men to whom concepts like honesty,

truth and in�egrity mean

nothing. This essentially, however, was p�rt of the pseudo -com.�unist system
:,Jkrum;ih was buildi ng . 11
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Nkr1L'llab 1evoted most o� his ef::'orts in the cultivation of cocoa.
s�phasis on coc::>a e.s the

This

orJ.y 2.gricultura.l prod:.lCt was the major problerr. of

-27Ghana ' s econo�y.
world market.

The revenue from cocoa i s dependant upon its price in the

There has been

a

de cline in its price since

195 7 .

In

the price fell from $98 5 a metric ton during that year to a low of
ton in

1965 .

foreign exchange which stood at

The countrys

that time of independence fell t o
�he other major cause

$126

million i n

1961.

33

$700

1956

$138 a mE;"'... !'ic

million at

of economic proble�s , apart from the emphasis on

cocoa, was Nkrumah ' s control of the e conomy, especially the agricultural sector.
Beginning in

1958

he began to restructure the agricultural as well a s the in-

dustrial sectors to facilitate his control.

He replaced administrative per-

sonnel in governmental agencies with his party loyalists.

In

1959

he replaced

the Ghana Marketing Board, of the Ministry of Agriculture, with an agency called
the Ghana Cooperative Council

(U.G.F. C . C . ) .

The Shana Marketing Board

respons ible for buying and selling of government cocoa.

W2.S

I t was also responsible

for the i s suing of cooperative licenses to farmers as well

as

providing machinery,

fertilizers and insecticides to independent farms and gove rnment-owned

farms .

Records of this Board show that it had been effici ent in it ' s responsibility with
regards to the farmers and the government .
The responsibility of the Marketing Board was turned over to the U . G . F . C . G .
The members of this agency were all members of the Convention Peoples Party and
were very loyal to Nkrumah .
tivit i e s .

This facilitated Nkrumah ' s control over their a.c-

The Nati onal Liberation Council Com.�ittee on Agriculture found th�t

all but one of the officers of the U.G.F.C . C . had the required qualifications.
Under the U . G . F . C . C . nearly all inde9endent fa rrr�rs and cooperatives were put
under its control.

'rhose tbc.t existed independently had to do s o under very

34

d if:'ic;ilt con:iitions.
By

1961

about

15,000

independent COO?eratives with an ;;sset of over

Million had been brought under the control of the U . G . � . 'J . 'J .

$16

!.�e�otism and

-28corruption was rampant.

Inquiring on the mal?r&ctices of the

U . G .F . 8 . C . ,

the National Liberation Council Committee on the purchase of cocoa states:
"The U . G .F. C . C. brought in paid treasurers ·who were
illiterate . There was 5Vidence of rigging tbe cocoa
machines, of delays in wei�hing and in being . absent
from the buying stations . Eome of �he officers required
tributes from junior officers when they visited t.he
agricultural stations . It is believed that senior
officers of the J . G . � . C . C . demandej between 150 to
1100 as a bribe to allow the opening of a cooperative
society in the villages." 35
By 1966
U . G . E' . C . C . • s

it

was estimated that of the 1500 coop'= r·-tives put

control in 1961, only 870 remained with

an

down from $16 million in 1961 to $2 .5 million in 1966 .

36

asset

the

under

that

dropped

Another area of mismanagement by the U.G.F.C . G . was the buying of agricultural machinery from the Soviet Union.
to be unsuitable for farming conditions
had the following

machinery:

in

Most of this mach inery
Ghana.

of this machinery was

unserviceable

ordered spa!'e parts with the

In 1965 the U .G.F.G . C.

919 tractors, 1,087 tillers and

32 combines, 20 corn huskers and 95 tillers.

turned 0ut

By 1966 it was

cultivators,
estimated

that 15%

in Ghana because the govern.�ent had not
37

machinery.

The agricultural firms under the U.G .�. 8.C . were divided into five groups :
1) cooperative farms , 2 ) state farms, 3) workers brigade, 4 ) young farmers
league, 5 ) others in joint ownership
had 1,114,315 acres of

with

the university of Ghana.

?he

U.J.7.8.�.

land.

TABLE II
THE U'i'ILIZATION OF U!L BY STATS

AND

:

?J.7P."fE F�_RMS-:f

Land
.Acquire:i
Area
Area
Area
Planted
Acquired
Planted Land ""
%
Cleared
/0
�o�p Farms
870
Oo23
339,610
23, 705
5
18,413
123
State ?arms
0.80
345,080
90, 645
64, 246
19
Workers Brigade
47
0.24
280,677
25,490
19,140
7
0.02
Young Frmr . League
37
60,362
1, 999
1, 950
3
Oth€rs
123
Oo13
12
10,369
88,386
18,238
•rotal State Farms 1, 205 l,llh,315
1042
160;077
14,136
10
?ec.sant i.i'arms
640.!000
98.58
7z937l3J5 7z937z305
'�3t�tiFti�S of !i';;.rming a�:i S s rvj_ce Stationso The :tebp lblic o"' Ghana. ..:.ccra

Types of !ioldings

lo
t. ,.
�,).1 ? 0 7 0
/ :::>

Number

·,

-29Even though they bad the largest amount of land and better farming equipFor example,

ment the utilization of the land by the state farms was very small .
state farms acquired

people

345 , 000

and good machinery.

acres of land with an average labour force of 20, 000

Rowever �nly 19% of this 12n1 was utilized.

total percentage of the land planted

\J.SS

less than two percent.

The

On the other

hand, peasants who acquired less land , poor machinery and problems of insecticides and fungicides utilizej more land for planting.

In 1965 they produced

98% of Ghana ' s food stuff.

TJ..B!E

III

RT.rllZNlJ"E OF STATE FJ.Ri.IJS *

1965-67

Year

Outside Finance$

Annual Labor Force

Revenue$

8, 000 , 000
2 0,800
1965=66
1,400, 000
4,ooo,ooo
13,500
1,300,000
1966-67
*Statistics o f Farming and Service Stations. The Republic of Ghana . (Accra
1965) P • 8.

The reason for this low production

and

loss of revenue was given by the report

of the National Liberation Council ' s Committee on Agriculture:
"Thousands .of workers were dumped on these farms through
political pressures. Consequently the number of workers
employed on �he proJec�s •cs econvmico...LJ..y unrelated to
the actual returns . In fact as the farms were ai.rectea
frot1L �he head office, no proper account was Kept or
expenditures and returns from these farms . Farm managers
who lacked the managerial· experience and initiative
required for work were entrusted for obviously political
reasons ." 38
Between

1957

During this

and 1959
same

agricultural production in

period Ivory �oast h ad

an

Ghana increased only

increase of 66�.

Ghana ' s

agricultural output ?€r c a�ita increased during the same 9eriod only by 16%.
Cn tbB other hand, agricultural out�u� in the Ivory �oast increasej 35�.
?roduction of other crops also decreased in proportion to th8

land

39

util i z e � .

-

30

-

The only crops that were produced substc:.ntially were cocoa, yarn and cassava
I

which are the chief staple foods in �hana .

I t is worth noting here also that

the great€st producers of this food stuffs were indepenjent ccoperativcs and
peasant farmers .

Production of crops was as follows:

TAB!E

1'"00D

IV

CROP PRODUCTION*

1964-66
1964

Area Planted

(1000

Crop

soo

Maise

acres

Production in

)

170
434

411

Corn

255
105
159
402
603

Millet
Rice

Groundnuts
Cass ava
Cocoyarn

1966

42
301
� c3
107

602
434
333
65
80
364
431

Naise
Corn
Nillet

Rice

Groundnuts
Cassava

Cocoyam

"*Economic Survey, Ghana

1,000

Metric Tons

_,..I

66

(Accra, 1969) p.4.

29
20
1152
1170

Industry

..

Nkru111a.h turned to industrialization when he found that his agricultu:. :?.l
policies were a failure o

The industries included a major production industrf,

Fibre Bag Manufacturing Industry, vegetable and oil industries and textile mills

1966

50%

industries.

In

capacities.

Therefore a good number of these industries were operating at a

tremendous loss.

these industries were producing less than

of their

The ��jor c�uses of this were lack of effect�ve Dlanning ,

bureaucratic inefficiency and malpractices.

I n its inquiry on gover�ment

ind�strial activitie s , the Nat�onal Liberati�n Council So!IL�ittee on Agrir.:ultilr� Toe.de the f0llm-ring conclusion:

"The successful operation of these. in-

-31dustries was hindered by lack of qualified tEc�nicians, competent managers,
nepotism, over-staffing and inadequate supply of raw materials coupled with
inavailability of foreign exchange for the importation of other items needed
in the production and manufacturing process .11

4o

Some of the factories were established where no nrovisions had been made
for the availability of the raw material required to run tb�m.

One reason fo r

this was the desire of the regime t o satisfy certain political interest deman1s .
Consequently the supply of raw materials was of secondary importance.

In other

cases poor feasibility studies for the execution of the projects and lack of
effective coordination at the planning stage among the various agencies con�erned
with the e stablishment of the enterprise contributed to the inefficiency of the
41
industries.
Eighty-five percent of Ghana ' s manufacturing was in the agro-industrial
area.

Nkrumah constructed the Volta Hydro-�lectric Dam for the processing of

Brixite.

The cost of this dom was $196 million.

The utilization of this da.�

in the food processing industry was under 25% and its utilization for the entire

42

manufacturing business was under 50%.
By 1965 Ghana ' s foreign exchange was completely exhausted .

In order to

finance many of bis economic projects Nkrumah turned to East I;uropean countries
and to some countries in the west for loans.

The major part of Nkru.i�ah 1 s loans

were through wba.t is called ' suppliers credits ' .

The term 1 suppliers credit1

relates to a particular form of financing eq1.:. ipment and material imports .
sup9lier
2

"I'he

does not necessarily provide the loan directly, this usually comes from

separate financing institution, but arranged by the SU?!)lier.

made, an1 payable, in foreign exchange .
short-tern

loan.

They

Supr:;lier

cre di ts

This loan is

may be regarded as a

arc= payable before the project for wbich they have been

ne5otiat:d :-;E.n be eXD6Ct".;d -r,o ge!1erai:.e incoms to allow re"9ayment on a self liqui1atin; :asi s .

Sa??liers cre1it are short-term -not on a financial but on

an e conomic criterion.

-32-
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Nkrumah · obtained suppli r;r
c ountri e s .

credit from both the 11ie st and Ea st Eurouean

In terms of interest on th e supplier credit

5-6%

pean countries had inte rest rates of
years.

pr i nc iple payable in

12

44

years.

The

the v·e st i:.uro-

with a princ iple pa yable in

Loans from East Eurooean countries had i nterest

.

loans ,

rates of 2-3%

5

to

8

on a

low interest from East �uropean countri�s

was due to the very close relationship which N
krumah had 1e'Jelope1 with these
c ountri e s .
Ghana ' s foreign exch ange liabilities with

regards

to suppli e r credit loans

i s as follows :

TABIE V
FOREIGN LXCHANGZ LIABIIJTIES*
Note:

End

of

n . c . •lfow Cidi, appr oximately One Dollar
Year Total Liab ili t ie s
Liability of

uppli ers

S

38, 372 n . c .
346,786 n.c.
386,363 n.c.
375,457 n . c .

1963

1964
1965
1966

*Ghana Economic Survey, The Ce nt ral
By

1966

% of Total

Credit

82.4

82.4
286, 276 n.c.
79.5
301,010 n.c.
71.9
283,583 n . c .
Bureau of Statistics (A ccra, 1969).

Ghana ' s debt service had r i se n

to 50%

of its export ea rnings .

I t is estimated that Nkruma'b signed sixty-nine financial agreements with .foreign
agencie s .

Of these sixty-nine ,

forty-seven were made with Western firms,

eight w'Lth the Soviet Uni on anj fourteen with 3ast European

1965,

be cause of worsening economic con1itions, many

countries.

for€ign investm�nts.
of e: quipme nt .

it

Due

freight insurance

and

'i'he
dividends on

to this there was a continuous delay in the shipment

The estimate of ��krumah 1 s debt has v?.ried widely.

s��ms to have rsached

Sy

Western fina.ncial insti-

tutions refused to accE:pt financial agreements with Nkrumah ' s re gim€ .
government was even unable to pay for i mport s ,

45

20

million j �llars.

However in

This debt included a

1966

medium-term

debt

-33at an interest of 60% in five ye�rs and
of 5% in

19

year�.

on e long-term d�bt with a� interest

Three -fourths of this debt is acc ounted for by s uppli e r s creditors

in the Unit ed King:iom.

Fivc bundrE:d thousand :iollars was owed to financial

agencies in the Unit(;; d States and.
Soviet U�ion.

71.7%

46

$150,000

was owed to financ ial agencies in the

Ghana had a s ubstanti al trade relation with the Soviet union an1 East

European countrie s .
35%.

In 1965 Ghana ' s ex?orts t o the 8omm�nist block re£ch�d

Foreign inve stment was very small because of the fear that ��kru."!'12.h i11i ght

nationalize the industr i e a .

Britain was tht:. major •.re st ::..:uro-oean c ountry that had

a substantial inve stment in Ghana .

The others were owned by lfr:cans from other

countries,.
Ghana 1 s foreign rese rve had dropped down from th� $7)0 million it � � d in-

herited from the British administration at independence t o

$300

million.

There

was an unfavourable balance of ?ayments due to the high rate of g overn.m�nt expen1 iture on capital equipment which was unor oductive .

The cost of imoorted

goods was very high, this was due to the government ' s deliberate policy of tbe
allowing of im�orts of consumer goods to counteract nrice raises on internal
ma.rket s .

The im�lort restricti ons instituted by Nkrumah were not only erratic

47
but subject to removal by negoti ation.
There

were

strikt:s all ove.r ::Iha!'la.

:Oy the time the- military took over tbs

gove rn.ment , there was 2 great shortag� o� :J.hane 1 s staple

.t'
.i. 001S

due to strikes that exten�cd to the agricultur8l depart�ent .

•

This was mainly

0ue to thess st�:kes

in this department , most of the ferme r s wer� not SUjDlied with the necessary

SO'- els and fert�_lizers.
!!�litary in Political Le � d c rshi�
_ :E
.

"":f j Jr

to

.;oal 'Jt: th� n5.litary regime wa s to stabilize Gh ana ' s ..:.c'.1no:
·ay .

::lo th ts ·0h�y nr:.cdcd .:.'i ne.ncial ai-:1

·::;:-

-34fi cation with regard s to obtaining aid from abroad.

Howeve:r,

3ast and �'Jest .

1967 led the militc.ry
Union,

!'.�a.st

nu.11b� r in cluded

gcverni01ent to te;r11inatt th�ir rcl c:tionship with

military
curr�d
tance .

Europe: an

665

technicians

the

advantages to

1967

in Gh ana -w�re:

S2 Chines�

:::tussi2ns,

In

fr om bo0h

military regim�

the: 3oviet

ove: r one-th')u.send ::i.us :;i�ns,

prompt.ly expelled .

48

pro -1 -e st:.; rn

:'bcse
with

This

The poli ci � s of th�

technicic:ns .

govern.rnent w�rt? th� refor� pro-:,reste rn .

ce .rt ain

acquircj aici

the. fear of a Soviet Union s ponso red counter-c oup in

.Cuba and scme "Sast �uro:_)ean countri e s .

Chim·s� and

They

p')lici.es

in-

regar·:ls to eJ�t�rnal a s s i s -

Many countries in the ·v;est that had been antagonized by Nkru.'!lah 1 s brand

of ?an-Africanism and anti -coloni al sentiments were quick

to

r�spond to the needs

of Ghana during the mi litary re gime •

.

In

1966,

the milit ary government asked the Inte rnational Monetary ?und

to study the economic condition of Ghana.

Other nations volunteered to be

members of the gro-.1p th at was formed by the IMF.
Frei.nee , We st

Crermany, Italy, J apan,
49

Kindgom and the United St�tes.
agre ement with

in

the

These countri�s uere Canada,

the Netherlands, Switze rland , the United

At the end of these studi�s th e H7 rr.ade �n

military officers whereby Ghana was allowe d to draw

5C

$36,400,000

various currencies within a twelve month period ..
To help re li e ve food sh ortage in Ghana t h e rdli ta!'y govt:rnment mc;d� c: gre e -

ments with the Unit�d Stat�s �nd othr: r c0untries for the

2, )00, 900

late

1966 the

U . S o suppli ed

oil,

tobacco,

and cotton through �he � . L .

supplied

17 , 500

guarant(.:'.� of

pounds of r i c e ,

supply of

maize,

480 � rogram .

food.

In

flour, vegetable

7hc 82nadia.1 gover.i.m�nt

tons of flour �d the Uni t�j !Cing:iom off� red a.11 €.Z_port c-redi t

$600,000

5.n

low

pc.yments for :rh ana ' s

commodities from the Unit�d �tates and �2nada.

51

ir.nediate

?ht. :.: . ;, • also s b ow:;d its s.-;;proval of th� �i:'.. � tary
·oy inc:.�e a.sin5 i .:.;s f:i.n::..nc:al

a

ssist?nce to Ghana.

im:,:iortation of the

?ro--. ·cst�rn

oolicies

Dur·in5 l�kru."'nah' s regime the

-3 5the United Statc:s :lid not give any aid t·o Ghana .

regime, the · U .s.

$61.8

a:bout $75

gava

1966,

· Since

milli on in loans.

million in aid,

,

du ring th� military

$13 .2 million in

grants

and

the U . S . pr ovide d

25 police offi c ers

military officers and

How� vcr

here

training for 41 d·hanaian
52
in the U . 3 .
I t is estimated

tbat under the military, Ghana r eceived a·oout tw0-th irds of Uni te d States aid
to Africa.
Canada,

Other cou.ntrie;s which provided financial assi stance to Gh ana were

Japan,

2 . 5 million

and Australia.

53

The total amount. of aid from

penditure s .

It

sold some

th� mi litary

regime was to

There

their operations.

were

a

'i'he National Liberation -Council

1)

organi zations:

the oil

palm

fibre corporation took ove r
th e rubber

the

(NLC)

the pr oducti on

corporation was

state farms at

th�

t ime of tb<:: coup .

as s i gne d . the state farms to the following

cooperation

was given 4

oil proj ects;

4) the extention ser-

In addition,

78

farms projects

of agriculture was

use

whose

land

jects were give n 20 farm

seed multiplication

farms were turned over

37 fc.rm

projects

centres, shortag� de?Ots

b;>r Hkrumah for

as c ompensation.

his

The rest

to the Firest on� Cornoration
which
.

milito.ry g�ve rnment to manufacture tires in Ghana .

and

stat� farm pro-

of

the state rubber

made a.n agreement

with

55

J:'... r-:;ct governmental agricultural and e c onomic activitits were

to '2ntc"'Dris

pro-

54

was confiscated

p roje cts

rice

s old to independent farme rs and the

given the authority to realloc ate

of extention bases,

rrhe farmers

were

2 ) the

and proces sing of 10 fibre projects;

given nine rubber projects;

workshops for agri cultural institute s .

the

125

financial burden of

of agriculture took over the management of thre e

ministry
for

total of

c ar ri ed the

C):-

enterprises �nd

the ministry

of

jects.

reduce governmental

of the stat e farms to indivi dual

de centralized the rest to local agencies who

vice

was

dollars .

'rhe se cond policy of

3)

th.:.se countries

limited

only

. s t.h a t ha.d a subst antial operation2l adv2nt 2.ge;; over peasant :farme rs

.

1\-, � c·J·.:. :. v.:: "i: i :- n

o:

c ott, on an::l. sug�r was intensiried t o supply the raw ma.t·:: r i al

.

-36were not in op�ration in

1966.

To facilitate more production and at the s ame

time reduce. the cost of production , factories were re loc ated to a rea s ;..>here the
raw ma te rial was available .

I:;xperienced technical as well as a:iministrative

personnel were provided by the Jnite1 Nations to help design and supervise th�
The number of farm workers w�s drastically cut d0v.1Il.

projects.

The r� sult of

56

these policies was an increase in the revenue from the state farr
ns.

TABIB VI
filW.J.:NUE

OF

STATE FARMS

*

1967-70
Year

1967 -68

Outside Finance

2,600,000
1, 800, 000
700 000

1968-69
1969-70
-�

.i:,conomic

1969

and

A nnual Labour Force

9,000

n.c.
n.c.
n.c.

Survey. · _{epubli c of

1970).

S, 300
4 650
Ghana, Central

dureau of

Revenue

1,850,000
2,800, 000
1 850 000
S tati stics Accra

The production of most of �hana • s principle food crop during the military
regime incre !'lsed over the production during Nkrumah 1 s regime .

This was partljr

due to the full utilization of the land and good planning and effic ient man&gement .

TABIE VII
LAN� UTILIZATION

*

1968-69
1968
Maize

Crop
.

Sorn

Millet
t: .
_

..l.C!:

Area ?lant�d in 1 000 Acres

517
298

1000
253
72
57

Production in

271
88

me tr i c

tens

42

Groun:3nut s

1969

�rop

:'�aizt:

Corn
:�illet
?..i c!�
G-rounjr.uts

300
96
90
60

680

3S9

400
100
400
Aid 2e quirement.

1350

Jan-June

1969; rlepublic

of Ghana

(1070)

-3 7Due to the conditions of decline o f cocoa pricls i n the world market, t h e
military regime made efforts t o diversify Ghana ' s agricultural production.
These efforts to diversify included encouraging the grovrth of such crops a s
oil palm, sugar cane, cotton and rubber .

I t also extended its agricultural acti-

vities by creating �ducational centres for the training of youths in .:t·arming
pr.actic e: s .
Program .

In

1968

the gov�rnm�nt embarked o n a t'eeders Reads Devt..lopment

The main obj�cti"ltt of this ;:-rogra:r, wa.z to improve the move:i!ent of pro-

d�ce from the ��ral centres to th�
farmers '

tovra.

In order to minimize fluctuation in

income s , farmers were guaranteed minimu.m prices for rice and waize at

v.:hich price th� food raarketing corporation would purchase any quantities of these
products.

The increase in guarant eed minimum prices was frorr.

for rice and from
to

14%

$4.50

to

in producers prices.

$7.00
57

for mai ze .

with

The government 1 s industrial policy

$6 . 2 0

to

$7 .50

The price of cocoa was increased

regards to private sectors was
During Nkrumah ' s

to encourage Ghanaian control of certain parts of the economy .

regime, major parts of tbe business i n the private sectors were 0�-ned by ex!)atriates .

The reason for this was the fact that only expatriates co·_t.ld afford

to pay the bribes for licenses to governmental officers needed to open up a bus-

58

iness in Ghana.
The nations that had business interests in Ghana during 1;krumah 1 s period
were> Britain, Lebanese and Syrian merchants , I t alians,
high numb�r of Africans from neighbouring countries.

more than 5,000

of the country ' s

103,000

from neighbouring countries owned

3,000

Je�ans,

:n 1962

French a:id e. V';!ry

2-J.ropeans owned

industrial e s tabli shment s

iniustries.

59

while

Africans

B�caus� of foreign domi-

nance in the industrial sector of Ghana ' s economy, th� mil�tary government em-

bfi r!<ej on � �::ri!!S of measures in

1968

to !'educ� s uch domirnrnce an'.3 to allow

}i1Cl.t:.s iai1s t 0 ?lay a major p2:-:-t i n the ovme rs::i::i o-:: petty busin6sses and in-

-38
In December of

1968

it introduced a decree which �rohibited foreign ovm�r-

ship of firms and industries with an annual gross national retail sales of under

$490, 000;

wholesale firms of

fewer than

30

$980, 000

or ltss;

industries and firms having

employees; and firms and industriEs in extractive, proces sing,

60
manufacturing or transportation busin�sses with a capital of
In November of

1969

$98,000

or less.

the goverP.ment instituted the Re s i d ence ?crmit Com-

This order was to rc:;strict other A fricans, Lebanese and Syrian

pliance Orde r .

61

merchants from petty businesseso

In the same year the government introduce d

the Ghanaian Business ?remotion Act.

This act orovi::led :or government assi st.3nce:
Th� act also charge1 for��ign

in the promotion of Ghanaian business enterprises .

business enterprises to maintain programs to train Jha.naians to a cquire the
sKills neces sary for the op� rati 0n of businesses .
ness enterpri ses that woul1 be

r� s e rve d

�he act further listed busi-

exclusiv�ly for Ghanaian ownership.

These included overseas businesses operating in Ghana,
by lanj , bakeries, printing, be auty shops,

commercial transportation

commodity broke rages,

advertising

62

and publicity an1 manufacturing of cement blocks.
These decrees were mainly aimed at other Africans, Lebanese and Syrian
businessmen.

The result of these decrees was the confis�ation of some

63

by the 6overnment.

600 firms

The majority of these firms were own�d by A!ricans from

neighbo-..iring v-;�st African countries.
O?posed by Sierra L�one ,

and Nigeria.

This act of the military g;ove rnment was
In Sierra Leone, the government r� act�d

to this act by expelling all Gh anaian fishermt·n doing busine es in �r.� etmm.
·.-k stern European fir'1s were not v�ry much a f±'ec�ed by these 1ecrees.
th�

�overnment introduced the

o

v

�n,.:i
e..
••

"' r i nci.
· !:"
,.... 1 ,. '
�

inve st�apital In1estment tct to induce 1uron�an
.

-::'h e s e ind.ucements included guar2nte·ed transfer of profits,

r;.ents in J.bana .
l.
· ,...-'�+
l. I,;e r,,_; ...

In fact

� •

·n
�
,
i
••com
...:

· !'> ::>. .
::i n'-<� duti
f' .:-_
· on !"
_ ._,.,, t ,_
- ��
� n�
�rorn +.- ar'i- _
r' a\
" 'd c
'"'""'. h oli.
� "'
--t (A.{
�

• -

-3 9-

ment

was

good .

ness

and

a

I n the industri a l area,

drop in

ment revenue

industrial

was

activities

of

an incre as �

The re was

bu.sinesse .:: .

government-owned

from the

there

foreign

c;.n

busi-

in private

increase in govern-

companies.
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1966-68

1966

Nkrumah Industries

Rev�nue

Uumter of 2stabli shme �ts

T otal
State-OVmed
Joint-State-Owned
Co-operatives

267
74
7
3

Private

183

142 ,lLJ
31 , )57
11 , 2 66
88
99 , 232

Total

383
68
12

176,656

1968 Military Industries

State-Owned
Joint-State-Owned
Co -ope rati ve s
Private
*

St a ti st i c al Year Book, The

Revenue from

export

n.c.
n.c.

n.c.

n.c.
n.c.
n. c.

43, 61) n . c .
20 , 599 n . c .

1
302
?-ebupli c of Ghana, 1967-68.
_

16 n . c .
112,440 n . c .
(Accra, 1970)p. 86.

agricultural commodities was also incr6ased due to the

in-

crease in production.

TABLE IX
EXPORT EAPJ.{DIGS

*

1965-69
Ex9ort Earnings

1965
Nkrumah 1966
Military 1 968
I-iilitary 1969

226 , 882

Nkrumah

*

Statistical

191,393
2L..5 , 12 2

338 782 n.c.
Year Book, Th�

'rhe value of

e xports

from a deficit in 1966
ihe

t otal

governm::nt

�d·fin ";"11 i.2.lion.

Il o C o

n.c.
n. c .

as

R epublic

a wh ole

of Ghana,

was incre a s l'! d by

to an estimatbd surplus o f

re-ceipt in 1969 includ ing

This was

A�cra, 1970

0

12�; .

p.

2030

Th� balan ce of

over $30 million

in

1968.

ai3 minus

payments

an incre9.se of 13 .5J� , from the 1968 level.

3ec2use

committed

trade

was

-40of the high price of cocoa i n the wo�ld

were 0250.4

re:.ceipts from cocoa

1967

In

mark�t

i

mill on .

1�ring the military �egime,

'rhis was an i ncr e a se of'

19 .1%.

the military dev&lucd the Gha�aien currency to thirty percent.

This devaluation h�lped to red re ss some imbalance in external payment s .

was a ste�p rise in cocoa prices in

e

helped to offset th

tier gold pric�s.
bulli on

.

The increase in the c ocoa Drice

value of Ghana ' s exports.

1968 the militar-.r

In March of

1967-68.

Thtre

regime

introduced the inte rnational two

This effort improved Ghana ' s earnings from the s ale s of gold

By the time

the military relinquished p owe r to civilian

Gh a na 1 s balance of payment stood at

5687. 2 million.

rule

in

1969 ,

This was consi :lered a verJ

favourable balance of payment.

Therefore with reg�rds to the economi c conditions i n Ghana, my propo sal
which states that 1 1 a substantial military involvement
will be followed by in<!rease
My rese arch tende

in

the political process

e

in e conomic deve lopment" s e ms to hol d true .

to show that the reilitary r egime substantially imnrov�d the

economic conditi ons in Ghana.
Human Resources: �duc ation
My research indicated that more sch ools were c0nstructed during the mili
tary regime than during the civil i an gove rnment of Nkrumah . There were more
s tudents enrolled in school �l:.iring the :\krumah peri od than in th.! mili tery

regime .

In

1965, 75%

of the ?r ima ry ag� c� ild ren were 1.n school.

The high

enrolb1e nt during this pe r iod wvs �uc to the fr�I'! e duce.ti':m which �Tkrt�Tilah inst ituted in

1961.

iiowGver in

1966

'iue t'J the e conomic -problem,

fre� �chools tcr:r�0:'.'arily
."'!:..dl:lc sc�Jools

a:l:i

o

the m ilit ary h:.:id t o abolish

:Che charf;5 for text bo o!<:s -.J
. as

�; 10 . 00 �or s � c ond 8r:' schools .

:,:.0n o: s":,u-:'·�nt;:. ·: :ii·o::!..J.m�nt in scbool to

40;.. .

) 3 . 00

for

?rima!'y

This acti ''n csused

:-Iowevcr, �ht-

2

ai;j

r'.:c1uc-

ove ra ll e }�p�n:li t.u.r�s

-hlT.\:3IB X
NUMBER

AND T l'PE OF

t;D:rcATIJi,l fL :C� ST
IT13
TI 0Hs�..

Type of S ch o ol

:�rumah 1964-65
10, 3 25
7 , 900
2 , 112
136

Total number of schools

Frimar.r schools
Hi::l::ile schools
Secondary schools
Technic:a l s chools
Tec:.chers 1 'I're.ining Colleges
Higher educati onal institutions
Type of School
Total Numb � r of schools

l�4
. h8

3
Military 1966-67

schools
Middle schools
Second&ry s ch ool s
Technical schools
T�achers' Training Coll�ges
Higher educational institutions
-lf- Statistical Y�ar Book, The ::tepublic
Pr imary

l0,660
7 , 913
2 , 365
163
61
83
3

of Gh-sna,

196$=66
l0,561
7, 961
2 , 267
150
45
83
3
1967 -60
10 , 946
7,480

1967 -68 (.A ccrc;.,

3 , 036
167
63
82
3

1970)

p.

191.
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of 3chool
.4 dministration
?riffiary" school
Secondary school
Colleges and Univ�rsiti�s
T�chnical Training Sc'.·:. ools
A:iult e d . , libra ries, museu.'lls
T-

e

Total------------------------

Type of School
Administration

Pr imary school
Secondary school
Colleges and Univers it i es
Technical Training Schools
�1ult c d . , libr.;rics, musem:ns
Others

Total--------------------�",� Stci.tistical Year Book, Tbe Republic "J f

l>Tkrumah

1965

1966
1,0 1 . 3 n . c .
11,867.4 n . c .
3 , 893. 4 n . c .
13,616.4 n . c .
2 , 006.0 n . c .
376.1 n . c .
33,491.8 n . c .
Military 1967-69
2,481.4 n.c.
2 7 , 223.4 n . c .
Nkrumah

3 , 2 o. n . c •
2 3 , 921.5 n . c .
7 , 902. 9 n . c .
28,261 . 8 n . c .
1,393. 0 n . c .
1, 082.3 n . q .
66,003 . 0 n . c .
Hilitary 1966=67
2 ,551 . 7 n . c .
27,143.3 n . c .
io,;77.L n . c .
8,567 . 3 n . c .
2 8 , 240.7 n . c .
26,924.2 n . c .
1, 814. ;) n.. c .
1 , 864.4 n . c .
1,318.6 n . c .
1,866 . 9 n . c .
611.0 n . c o
212 .s n . c .
172
066. 9 n . c .
68 460.l n . c .
::. cc!' a , 1 97 0 -o . 70-71.
}hana, 19

-42TABLE Y..II
NUMBER C? ME:DICAL ??250NNEL

Nkrumah
Government Hospitals
Doctors
Dentists
Nurses
Midwive s
Medical Field' Units
Qualified Pharmacists
5�

125
576
35
2 , 660
1,601
217
355

Statistical Yec.r Book, The

1965

Republic

1966
127
573
39
3,078
1,894
224
342

*

1967
129
497
35
3,173
1 , 981
224
357

Military

of Ghana,

1967=68 (Acc ra,

1968
129
539
37
5,0 95
2 , 3.34.
139
357
1970) p . 193.

The medical pers onnel and iterns tabulated above arc all employed 5.n government agenc i e s .

There were other medical h ospitals that b�longed to foreign

mining c ompa nies and Christian missionari� s .

These hospitals and their per-

sonnel are not included in this t a9le.
As the figures show tbe military government instituted more medical facilities in Ghana than during Nkrumah. ' s period.

There were c ontinuous shortages

of medical supplies due t o uneven distribution during 1-Jkrumah 1s regime .

The

largest amount of medical supplies and facilities were heavily concentrated in
the urban areas, the rura.l or villages be-nefitted very little from the medical
improvement.
To solve this problem, the military gove rnment introduced medical mobile
unit centre s .

Apart from distributing medic ine t o village s , these mobile

uni ts were also used· in health education helping villages become aware of
modern medicin� .
TABIE XIII

(per

t h ous2nd cidi

GOVERNMENT K�DIC.:\L EX?:-�'DITURE

Nkrumah 19
4,449 . 2 n . c .
4.1 n . c o
�osvitals
13,81S.2 n . c .
lfedicc.l ani Dental
L..72 . 6 n . c .
Special E�a.lth 3 e rvi ce s
918 . 9 n . c .
Total-- ------- ---- -----19 660.0 n . c .
':- '.::.atis-Cic:::. l �55.r Zook, The �c;_:mblic o f
Item

Administration
!tese.:::.rch

1 9 7-9
19 o-7
4,516.5 n . c .
4,83 9 . 3 n . c .
145 . 8 n . c .
n.c.
1+42 .. 2 n . c .
15,201 . 9 n . c .
n . c . 10,284.2 n . c .
n.c.
168 . 1 . n . c .
54.7 n . c .
1,213.9 n . c ,
n.c.
1,089 .2 n . c .
475.2 n . c . 1 6 565.5 n . c . 21 455.6 n . c .
19o7-· u o .kcra, 1970 p . 19

19
2,416.9
59.5
4,125.9
17 8 . 9
693 . 8

7

Jhana,

�!-

Mill. tary

n.c.

•
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Nkrumah l9b>
, 31.3 n . c .
264 . 9 n . c .
Child Care
31.0 n . c .
Care of Aged,Disabled
100.0 n . c .
Housing
L.,649 .. 2 n . c .
Other Welfare
332.9 n . c .
Total
101810. 2 n.c.
* Statistical Year Book, The Republic

T e of Welfare
Social Se curity
War Veterans

Military l9b7
l9bb
l9b7-69
n
.
c
.
21.9
22,7 1.1 n.c.
3 , ';/ . 7 n.c.
,
131.8 n . c .
55 . 8 n . c .
116 . l n . c .
8 . 5 n .c .
14.4 n. c .
46.9 n . c .
36.6 n.c.
86.1 n . c .
92.6 n . c .
2 , 77 2 .6 n . c .
639.7 n . c .
7 , 150.'/ n . c .
29.8 n.c .
221.6 n . c .
19L. . l n . c .
4.2239 .1 n . c . 112650 .6 n . c .
231410.1 n . c .
of Ghana, 1967=68. (A c c ra, 1970) P • 134..

CHAPTER V

CONCWSION
This

study show�d that

milit ary

the

proved itself !!lore useful

has

in terms

of providing economic benefits, b e tte r health aid and education for th� people
·'

of Gbana than the civilian gove rnment of Kwami Nkruma.h .
success was

their pro-Western

ness as well

as aid to Ghana .

polic i e s .

On

These policies

the other

h and

This

for this

attracted foreign bus i -

Nkrumah 1 s

colonial attitude caused many Western countries to
aid programs from Gh ana .

The reas on

anti-··�est and anti -

withdraw most business and

meant that NkrUinah had

to

?Ursuc

his e c0nomic

development progra�s �ith the scarce resources of Ghana and the little aid it
got from the Communist block.
It is not ass�ed here

that a

pro-:�estern policy

military regime or even a civilian gove ::-nment.
the c as e

of Ghana,

buted hea.vily
the

other

the ·':'ro-'!'·lcstern p ol i ci e s of the

to the

hand,

-�[hat

degree of economic rec·:r.rery

is

the best p ol i cy, for

one may suggest is

a

thc.t :i..n

military government contri-

during the!

militaX"J

regime .

On

it is worth noting here the:. t th� anti-��-estern ?Olicies of Ghana.

during >ikrumah ' s reg imL not only r� duce d
imo(;�ded : o re ig n investments
1,ltbcugh 0nt c.s nnot Mak:=;

in

th�

amount of aij co�ing to

Ghana espe ci�lly fr0m

an ace.:ie!nic citation bere:,

a

�hanc.

count r i e s of th ..:·
foreign

but

West.

� tud�nt from Jhana,

-44John Okipi informed this rese arcb e � that the c,r.A. was involved in �he overthrow of Nkrumah .
'i'he pro-Western policies of the military government provided the financh�l
aid the military needed for its programs .

A nd also as the table on foreign

investment shows there was an increase in foreign inve stment in Ghana.

It

is true that there was exploitation and black-mailing by foreign companie s .
What seemed to be important however, was the military regime needed the financial
aid ne cessary to implement some of their programs.
There was good reason for the army governme nt to ";)Ur sue

a pro-l·!e ster:i policy.

Nkrumah ' s relations with the Soviet Union and �ommuni st countries were very
strong.

There were advisors from the Soviet Union in almost all govern.'Tlental

agencies in Ghana during Nkrumah ' s -.regime .

_!\fter tbe coup the fe2r of a counter-

coup instigated by the Soviet Union, caused the military to deport a good number of Russian and Chinese advisors.

The pro-We stern 9olicy of the mili tarjr may

have been used by the army to counteract any effort of the Soviet Union and the
other Communist block coun�ries to undermine the military regime .
Nkrumah ' s misuse of power cre3t�d many enemies for him.

His ?reventive

Detention Act empowered him to arrest and imprison anyone who opposed h i s authority.
In an effor� to maintain control over Ghana, he appointed members of h i s political party to he.ad many of the gove rnme ntal a genc i e s
were not only illiterate but were
which they were assigned.

.

Most of thes� appointee s

completely ignorant about t h e agencie s to

This resulted in misman.sgement, corruption and in-

efficiency in most of the governmental agencie s .
The first thing the military officers did W3S to remove all of Nkrwnah ' s
political appointees and fill the facancie s with efficient Ghanaians and exvatriates a.s the case may be .

They also set free about

600 people
65

had imprisoned because of their opposition to � i s polici e s .

that NkrumC?.h

These G:cticns

-45by the military officers quickly legitim'!.. zed t he i r authority.
The major problem the military had to face was unemployme nt .
ed from the closing down of many state p roj ects and industr i e s .
was estimated th at

of

64, 000

workers were f ir e d .

th� labour force was e!!lploye d .

ment and the w�ion lead e r s .

During that

same

This result-

In

1968

it

year, about

25%

This caused some problems between the 5overn-

This problem was acce ntuated when the military i n

an austerity measure announced a cut of one pe rc e nt i n salary of some state
fa.rm workers .

Apc:.rt from this unerr.:ployment '.Jroblem, the economic

Ghana 1 s trade deficit on cur::-ent accounts wa.s dropp�d

tbe army were successful.
from
&

$1200

million in

surplus of

o.6%

in

1966

$29
to

policies of

1965

to

$20

million i n

1767.

By 1968

the government 2chi�v�d

66

The gross natiJnal nroduct w�s increas�d from

million.

2 .4% in 1967 .

This succe s s was due to a great extent to a very strong determination by
the military to legitimize itself as a respe ctable institution that was abmre

A poll conJucted in February of

the quarrel �nd corruption of politici�ns.

1968

showed that

91%

67

of the Ghanaian people wanted th!: military government to

continue to rule .
The significa.nce of t h is success is th� new image it c re at ed
instituti ons in most o f Africa .
se�n a s
ima�e

' savage •

for

military

?or most �fricans, the military i s no longer

and a vestige of the tool of colonial

i s on� of respect and a b�tter substitute

oppress i on .

for ci vili 3 n

�he new

government.

There has not b��n any m�jor critique of the military govern.ment with
regard to its
there was

p�rform�nce .

The !Tl.s.j or �eason for this K;.;.s due to th� fact th2t

m commissi on of inquiry

m.ent as was found at the .: nd of
authority

chi�

to

�or

the o.ctiviti�s cf the military govern-

!\kru.mah 1 s

regi'.'.ne

o

The military relinquished their

civilL?n gover!l.'lle:it through ;, peace'ful gene r2l �l::! ct i on in which

u.:.:rty of Jr. :J·.isd�.

w�n c.n ovr. ri·.rb �l.ming

n
: ajority of the se: a.ts in ?arli.!2f1e!lt.

-46Due to this pe aceful and legal W3.Y i n which the military relinquishe:d its authority,
the military regime

WP.S

considc��d by most }hana izns � s ef�icient 2ni n�n-corrupt.

Commi ssions of inquiry were ther�fore unne- ces sary.
One major thing that happened that rn�y h8ve resulted in disrespect :or the
2rrny was when it was found that :Jeneral Ankra, a high offic�o.l in the government was found guilty of brib�ry �nd

corruption.

In

self from corruption the military governrn(:: nt quic!dy

an

�ffort to viniicat� it-

re:.MOVc�

::ien�rr.l ...:..nkra

..:'rom

his position in the NationC>.1 Liberation •Jounc il.
In conclusion therefore . this reserrcb tends to sup?ort my pro::osc-ls tbat
military involvement in politics will re sult in:

2)

e�-pend iture s ;

1) an incrt:.<:-se in defense:

an increase in ?Ublic he alth exp�niitures;

3)

a_�

in

inc�easc

e conomic development/infra-structure expenditu:-es ( agricultur� , industry and
.

.

trade ) ; a.
�d

4)

.

.

an increase of expenditure on education.

In the cc.se of Ghana, one could say that the claims of :·re stern experts
that the military is a modernizing agent holds true .

It is a :iiffer�nt thing

however to s�y that what happened in Ghana can h2ppen in oth�r cou.�tries.

One

could easily make reference t o Datomey, in which the military has proven itself
ineffici �nt and corrupt.
It i s worth noting here that almost twenty-seven months after the milite.r1
government relinq�isbed its power, the government
by a.�otber nilitar.,� coup.

The re�sons for the

coup that overhtrew Nkrumah.

2)

Thes�

d.t!:crease in cocoa. produc-rAon,;

�;825

per

ton

in

1970

to

$4 �7 .5

3)

in

of Dr. 5ussia w�s overthrown

coup were

reasons includ e <l : 1 ) problems of inflation;
a

decrease in coco:i prices from

1972.

a.n

averag;!;

of

Inch1de j in the onuses of th� coup

wets the c:.buse of :n:.2.itary autono;rly an:i :;:-:rerogative s .

by :�ch'.! a?ong,

similar to those of the

:ca.der o� the:: cou;- in :;. radio

bros.dcast:

A sv.mmary -:>� this K::.s given

-47a'!'he first people which Buesia
the armed forces and police.
-

put

his eyes on were

Some .:trmv e.nr3. police officers
"

-

were dismissed under the pretext of retirement .

Some

officers we:re '9Ut i n certain positions t o suit the

whims of 3ussia '�nd his colleague s .
taking from us the i'ew

amenities �nd
�nd the

which we in th� armed forces

Then he: started
fa.cili ties

�olice enj�yed

even under the l�krumah regime- .
Having lowered morale i n the arm�d forces and
the police to the extent that officers could not
e xert :my meaningful influence over their men, so
that by this strategy c oming together to overthrow
his govern.me nt wa s to him im�ossible
he turned his
-

eyes on V.:� ci vilians11

67

in

Hili tary coup d 1 eta ts will continue being a io:n5.nant phienorn.erw
arE.as a.s lon� as the que st for or:ler prevails.

developing

This que st for order t�kt:s the

form of mobilizing the masses towards a sense of nati�nal identity to re?l�ce
tribH.lisrr., b<!tter he: a..lth and � duee.tion a.nd to some degree a. n even distribution

of the na.tions

wealth.

As long G.s · the!'e remains a group that

d�es

or iiscriminated against in t e rms of the d i stribution of wealth,
expect politic.:r.l unrest and thus milit ary tci.ke -overs.

feel

one
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